Podstrony
|
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
any honest intention and earnest endeavour to instruct and convince, and we can therefore only look upon
such quotations and references as embellishments to fill up gaps and hide defects.
CHAPTER VI. ON EXAMPLES 84
On War
It would be an immense service to teach the Art of War entirely by historical examples, as Feuquieres
proposed to do; but it would be full work for the whole life of a man, if we reflect that he who undertakes it
must first qualify himself for the task by a long personal experience in actual War.
Whoever, stirred by ambition, undertakes such a task, let him prepare himself for his pious undertaking as for
a long pilgrimage; let him give up his time, spare no sacrifice, fear no temporal rank or power, and rise above
all feelings of personal vanity, of false shame, in order, according to the French code, to speak THE TRUTH,
THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH.
BOOK III. OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL
CHAPTER I. STRATEGY
IN the second chapter of the second book, Strategy has been defined as "the employment of the battle as the
means towards the attainment of the object of the War." Properly speaking it has to do with nothing but the
battle, but its theory must include in this consideration the instrument of this real activity--the armed
force--in itself and in its principal relations, for the battle is fought by it, and shows its effects upon it in
turn. It must be well acquainted with the battle itself as far as relates to its possible results, and those mental
and moral powers which are the most important in the use of the same.
Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the War; it must therefore give an aim to the whole
military action, which must be in accordance with the object of the War; in other words, Strategy forms the
plan of the War, and to this end it links together the series of acts which are to lead to the final decision, that,
is to say, it makes the plans for the separate campaigns and regulates the combats to be fought in each. As
these are all things which to a great extent can only be determined on conjectures some of which turn out
incorrect, while a number of other arrangements pertaining to details cannot be made at all beforehand, it
follows, as a matter of course, that Strategy must go with the Army to the field in order to arrange particulars
on the spot, and to make the modifications in the general plan, which incessantly become necessary in War.
Strategy can therefore never take its hand from the work for a moment.
That this, however, has not always been the view taken is evident from the former custom of keeping
Strategy in the cabinet and not with the Army, a thing only allowable if the cabinet is so near to the Army
that it can be taken for the chief head-quarters of the Army.
Theory will therefore attend on Strategy in the determination of its plans, or, as we may more properly say, it
will throw a light on things in themselves, and on their relations to each other, and bring out prominently the
little that there is of principle or rule.
If we recall to mind from the first chapter how many things of the highest importance War touches upon, we
may conceive that a consideration of all requires a rare grasp of mind.
A Prince or General who knows exactly how to organise his War according to his object and means, who
does neither too little nor too much, gives by that the greatest proof of his genius. But the effects of this talent
are exhibited not so much by the invention of new modes of action, which might strike the eye immediately,
as in the successful final result of the whole. It is the exact fulfilment of silent suppositions, it is the noiseless
harmony of the whole action which we should admire, and which only makes itself known in the total result.
inquirer who, tracing back from the final result, does not perceive the signs of that harmony is one who is apt
to seek for genius where it is not, and where it cannot be found.
BOOK III. OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL 85
On War
The means and forms which Strategy uses are in fact so extremely simple, so well known by their constant
repetition, that it only appears ridiculous to sound common sense when it hears critics so frequently speaking
of them with high-flown emphasis. Turning a flank, which has been done a thousand times, is regarded here
as a proof of the most brilliant genius, there as a proof of the most profound penetration, indeed even of the
most comprehensive knowledge. Can there be in the book--world more absurd productions?[*]
[*] This paragraph refers to the works of Lloyd, Buelow, indeed to all the eighteenth-century writers, from
whose influence we in England are not even yet free.--ED.
It is still more ridiculous if, in addition to this, we reflect that the same critic, in accordance with prevalent
opinion, excludes all moral forces from theory, and will not allow it to be concerned with anything but the
material forces, so that all must be confined to a few mathematical relations of equilibrium and
preponderance, of time and space, and a few lines and angles. If it were nothing more than this, then out of
such a miserable business there would not be a scientific problem for even a schoolboy.
But let us admit: there is no question here about scientific formulas and problems; the relations of material
things are all very simple; the right comprehension of the moral forces which come into play is more difficult.
Still, even in respect to them, it is only in the highest branches of Strategy that moral complications and a
great diversity of quantities and relations are to be looked for, only at that point where Strategy borders on
political science, or rather where the two become one, and there, as we have before observed, they have more
influence on the "how much" and "how little" is to be done than on the form of execution. Where the latter is
the principal question, as in the single acts both great and small in War, the moral quantities are already
reduced to a very small number.
Thus, then, in Strategy everything is very simple, but not on that account very easy. Once it is determined
from the relations of the State what should and may be done by War, then the way to it is easy to find; but to
follow that way straightforward, to carry out the plan without being obliged to deviate from it a thousand
times by a thousand varying influences, requires, besides great strength of character, great clearness and
steadiness of mind, and out of a thousand men who are remarkable, some for mind, others for penetration,
others again for boldness or strength of will, perhaps not one will combine in himself all those qualities
which are required to raise a man above mediocrity in the career of a general.
It may sound strange, but for all who know War in this respect it is a fact beyond doubt, that much more
strength of will is required to make an important decision in Strategy than in tactics. In the latter we are
hurried on with the moment; a Commander feels himself borne along in a strong current, against which he
durst not contend without the most destructive consequences, he suppresses the rising fears, and boldly
ventures further. In Strategy, where all goes on at a slower rate, there is more room allowed for our own
apprehensions and those of others, for objections and remonstrances, consequently also for unseasonable
regrets; and as we do not see things in Strategy as we do at least half of them in tactics, with the living eye,
but everything must be conjectured and assumed, the convictions produced are less powerful. The
consequence is that most Generals, when they should act, remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts.
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pldoc.pisz.plpdf.pisz.plkskarol.keep.pl
|
