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little difference which happened. The choice might make a very great
difference. The uncertainty came from our ignorance, and not from the
close equality of the two alternatives. But if we are doubtful whether a
plate of turtle or a bunch of asparagus would give us most pleasure, or
whether the pleasure of a long walk outweighs the pain of it, we may at
least be certain that we shall not lose very much pleasure, whichever
alternative we finally select.
113. It has been objected to hedonistic systems that pleasure is a
mere abstraction, that no one could experience pleasure as such, but
Studies in Hegelian Cosmology/95
only this or that species of pleasure, and that therefore pleasure is an
impossible criterion. It is true that we experience only particular pleas-
ant states which are partially heterogeneous with one another. But this
is no reason why we should be unable to classify them by the amount of
a particular abstract element which is in all of them. No ship contains
abstract wealth as a cargo. Some have tea, some have butter, some have
machinery. But we are quite justified in arranging those ships, should
we find it convenient, in an order determined by the extent to which their
concrete cargoes possess the abstract attribute of being exchangeable
for a number of sovereigns.
114. Another objection which is often made to hedonism lies in the
fact that pleasures vanish in the act of enjoyment, and that to keep up
any good that might be based on pleasure, there must be a continuous
series of fresh pleasures. This is directed against the possibility of a sum
of pleasures being the supreme good. As we are here only looking for a
criterion, we might pass it by. But it may be well to remark in passing
that it seems unfounded. For so long as we exist in time, the supreme
good, whatever it is perfection, self-realisation, the good will will
have to manifest itself in a series of states of consciousness. It will never
be fulfilled at any one moment. If it be said that all these states have the
common element of perfection or the good will running through them,
the hedonist might reply that in his ideal condition all the states of con-
sciousness will have the common element of pleasure running through
them. Pleasure, it may be objected, is a mere abstraction. Certainly it is,
and the element of a pure identity which runs through a differentiated
whole must always he to some extent an abstraction, because it ab-
stracts from the differentiation. In the same way, perfection or good
will, if conceived as timeless elements of a consciousness existing in
time, are just as much abstract, since abstraction is thus made of the
circumstances under which alone they can be conceived as real and
concrete.
So long, therefore, as our consciousness is in time, it can be no
reason of special reproach to pleasure that it can only be realised in a
continuous succession. And if our consciousness should ever free itself
of the form of succession, there is no reason why pleasure should not be
realised, like all the other elements of consciousness, in an eternal form.
Indeed pleasure seems better adapted for the transition than the other
elements of consciousness. A timeless feeling is no doubt an obscure
conception. But we can, I think, form a better idea of what is meant by
96/John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart
it than we can of the meaning of timeless cognition or of timeless voli-
tion.
115. We now come, however, to a more serious difficulty. Hedonic
calculations require, not only that we should compare the magnitudes of
pleasures, but that we should add and subtract them. The actions which
we propose to ourselves will not each result in a single pleasure or pain.
Each will have a variety of results, and, as a rule, some of them will be
pleasures, and some pains. To compare two projected actions, there-
fore, it will be necessary in each case to take the sum of the pleasures,
subtract from it the sum of the pains, and then enquire which of the two
remainders is the larger positive, or the smaller negative, quantity.
Now pleasures and pains are intensive, not extensive, quantities.
And it is sometimes argued that this renders it impossible for them to be
added or subtracted. The difference between two pleasures or two tem-
peratures is not itself, it is said, pleasant or hot. The possibility of add-
ing or subtracting intensive quantities depends, it is maintained, on the
fact that the difference between two of them is a third quantity of the
same kind that the difference between two lengths is itself a length,
and the difference between two durations is itself a duration. And, since
this characteristic is wanting in intensive quantities, it is concluded that
it is impossible to deal with them arithmetically.
The question is one of great importance, and the answer affects
more than the hedonic criterion of moral action. It will, I believe, be
found on further consideration that, reasonably or unreasonably, we are
continually making calculations of pleasures and pains, that they have
an indispensable place in every system of morality, and that any system
which substitutes perfection for pleasure as a criterion of moral action
also involves the addition and subtraction of other intensive quantities.
If such a process is unjustifiable, it is not hedonism only, but all ethics,
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